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Chapter 10
Regulation of Space Activities
in The Netherlands
From Hugo Grotius to the High Ground of Outer Space
Frans von der Dunk
10.1 The General Background: The Netherlands
and Outer Space
The Netherlands, being aware of its relative size when compared to the major
spacefaring nations not only globally but also in the European context, has always
addressed outer space and space activities from the perspective of the role it could
feasibly play. It has thus concentrated on a few niche areas which were either closely
aligned to existing capabilities and experience or seemed to offer possibilities for
mid-size economies and societies to play an important role.
From this perspective, firstly the scientific and technical sector might be men-
tioned. Throughout history, a number of Dutch astronomers and astronomy institu-
tions have become famous across the world; and considerable know-how in those
areas has been consequently accumulated. Hence, the Netherlands was always par-
ticularly interested in the scientific exploration of the universe – even if it did not
require actual space activities to be undertaken.
The Dutch government had only two satellites launched on its own account,
which were completely Dutch-built, and both of them for scientific purposes: the
ANS (which stood for “astronomical satellite of the Netherlands”) in 1974 and
the IRAS (Infra-Red Astronomical Satellite) in 1983. Both were launched using
US launch vehicles. Since then, the Dutch involvement in satellite and other space
projects has been only collaborative, and not autonomous or leading.
The same was true also for the two Dutchmen who have so far travelled to
outer space. Both Wubbo Ockels and André Kuipers were part of the international
manned spaceflight projects in the context of European cooperation in space,
notably as astronauts of the European Space Agency (ESA)1 – even as Kuipers’
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first flight was paid for by the Dutch Ministries of Education and Science as well as
Economic Affairs.
Similarly, in line with the long-time engineering traditions in the Netherlands, a
distinct interest in space from the technical perspective has always thrived – from
government and academic institutions such as the Dutch aerospace agency NIVR
and the Technical University of Delft, to companies such as Fokker Space, later
Dutch Space, and Stork, finding niche markets in such areas as robotic arms and
solar panels. Again, strictly speaking this was not about space activities, but rather
(in this case) about building hardware as subcontractors to other non-Dutch main
contractors, or in the context of the Dutch membership of ESA and the various joint
cooperative projects undertaken within that framework.
Secondly, it was the international orientation, specifically in the context of an
international legal order flying the banner of peace and prosperity, which to a large
extent determined the manner in which the Netherlands became involved in activi-
ties related to or carried out within outer space. This was a tradition going back as
far as the seventeenth-century. Hugo Grotius, one of the founding fathers of inter-
national law, had written some of his most famous works on international peace
and wars, respectively on the “outer space of his days” that was the realm of the
high seas. Most of the Dutch activities focused, indeed, on ESA or other interna-
tional cooperative projects under bilateral or multilateral treaties, preferably within
a sound framework of international conventions and international law to guarantee
that power and money would not be the only decisive factors in determining the
shape and outcome of any such activities.
10.2 The Specific Background: The Netherlands
and International Space Law
The longstanding focus on scientific/technical aspects of space activities on the one
hand, and on an international/legal context for them on the other, constitutes the key
for understanding the approach of the Netherlands towards international space law,
as well as to the possibility, desirability or even the need to create national space
legislation as the main topic of the present book.
Clearly therefore, it was natural for the Netherlands to be interested primarily in
the international treaties thereby establishing primacy of the rule of law over power
politics. With no capabilities or even intention to play a leading role in activities
in outer space and in the absence of any private involvement in whatever space
activities were undertaken, the existence of a substantial body of international law as
such would generally be considered sufficient with no necessity of further national
implementation.
Thus, to start with, the Netherlands became – as one of only a handful of states
globally – a party to all the five treaties specifically developed with a view to outer
space and space activities (commonly referred to as the corpus juris spatialis inter-
nationalis). Not accidentally, that development took place at the United Nations as
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the prime global body tasked to maintain the rule of law and a minimum of peace
and prosperity among nations.
Firstly, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty2 was domestically approved by national law
on 12 June 1969, its ratification with the depositories took place on 10 July 1969 and
it entered into force for the Netherlands three months later, on 10 October 1969.3
Secondly, the 1968 Rescue Agreement4 was approved by the Dutch Parliament on
10 July 1980,5 as was the 1972 Liability Convention6 and the 1975 Registration
Convention.7 Finally, the Netherlands is one of thirteen states currently party to the
1979 Moon Agreement,8 the last space treaty to see the light of day within the UN
context.
All these treaties, however, become relevant only when the intention exists to
enter into outer space with a man-made space object.9 As, moreover, the only
space activities (in the above sense) undertaken by the Netherlands were carried
out under the direct control of the government, the need to establish any form of
“authorisation and continuing supervision” of “national activities in outer space”
conducted by “non-governmental entities”10 was practically absent. Likewise, the
need to deal with the consequences of international state liability for damage caused
2Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer Space Treaty), done 27 January
1967, entered into force 10 October 1967; 610 UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968
No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967).
3See Nederlandse Staatswetten, Editie Schuurman & Jordens, 104a (1981), at 3.
4Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, London/Moscow/Washington, done 22 April 1968, entered into force
3 December 1968; 672 UNTS 119; TIAS 6599; 19 UST 7570; UKTS 1969 No. 56; Cmnd. 3786;
ATS 1986 No. 8; 7 ILM 151 (1968).
5See supra note 3, 104a (1981), at 12.
6Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (hereafter Liability
Convention), London/Moscow/Washington, done 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September
1972; 961 UNTS 187; TIAS 7762; 24 UST 2389; UKTS 1974 No. 16; Cmnd. 5068; ATS 1975 No.
5; 10 ILM 965 (1971). See supra note 3, 104a (1981), at 18.
7Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereafter Registration
Convention), New York, done 14 January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976; 1023 UNTS
15; TIAS 8480; 28 UST 695; UKTS 1978 No. 70; Cmnd. 6256; ATS 1986 No. 5; 14 ILM 43
(1975). See supra note 3, 104a (1981), at 29.
8Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, New York,
done 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984; 1363 UNTS 3; ATS 1986 No. 14; 18
ILM 1434 (1979).
9This is essentially the case for the liability regime, where also failed launches could lead to appli-
cation of that regime; cf. esp. Article I(b), Liability Convention. Most rules, rights and obligations
contained in the corpus juris spatialis internationalis even start to become relevant, de jure or de
facto, only once a space object has actually entered the realm of outer space – wherever that may
begin.
10These concepts and terms are the ones used by Article VI, Outer Space Treaty, to indicate interna-
tional responsibility for space activities for certain states exists, which would almost automatically
suggest a need for such states to control those activities if not undertaken by the states themselves.
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by space objects (also) if privately launched, owned and/or operated11 was basically
absent, since there was no private launch, ownership or operation which the Dutch
government needed to be concerned about from that angle.
Because of the Dutch interest in maintaining international peace and security
by means of the rule of law, the Netherlands furthermore became a party to such
treaties as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty12 and the 1996 Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty,13 both of which have a specific bearing on the regime applicable to
outer space and space activities. At the same time, neither of them requires much
attention from the perspective indicated above with regard to the establishment of
national space legislation.
In a similar vein, since the Dutch focus is on international cooperation, espe-
cially when the pooling of financial and technical resources would result in added
value and synergies, the Netherlands became a member, in addition to ESA, of
the major international organizations undertaking space activities. This concerned,
most importantly, INTELSAT14, INMARSAT15 and EUTELSAT,16 all international
satellite consortia prior to their privatization. Also EUMETSAT,17 the cooperative
organization in Europe for satellite meteorology, counts the Netherlands as one of
its members. As for ESA itself, in the context of its optional programmes which
11This is the consequence of the space liability regime offered by Article VII, Outer Space Treaty,
and the various clauses of the Liability Convention.
12Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,
Moscow, done 5 August 1963, entered into force 10 October 1963; 480 UNTS 43; TIAS 5433; 14
UST 1313; UKTS 1964 No. 3; ATS 1963 No. 26.
13Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, New York, done 24 September 1996, not yet entered into force.
14INTELSAT was originally established by means of the Agreement Relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), Washington, done 20 August 1971,
entered into force 12 February 1973; 1220 UNTS 21; TIAS 7532; 23 UST 3813; UKTS 1973
No. 80; Cmnd. 4799; ATS 1973 No. 6; 10 ILM 909 (1971), and the corresponding Operating
Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT),
Washington, done 20 August 1971, entered into force 12 February 1973; 1220 UNTS 149; TIAS
7532; 23 UST 4091; UKTS 1973 No. 80; Cmnd. 4799; ATS 1973 No. 6; 10 ILM 946 (1971).
15INMARSAT was originally established by means of the Convention on the International
Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), London, done 3 September 1976, entered into
force 16 July 1979; 1143 UNTS 105; TIAS 9605; 31 UST 1; UKTS 1979 No. 94; Cmnd. 6822;
ATS 1979 No. 10; 15 ILM 1052 (1976), and the corresponding Operating Agreement on the
International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), London, done 3 September 1976,
entered into force 16 July 1979; 1143 UNTS 213; TIAS 9605; 31 UST 1; UKTS 1979 No. 94;
Cmnd. 6822; ATS 1979 No. 10; 15 ILM 233, 1075 (1976).
16EUTELSAT was originally established by means of the Convention Establishing the European
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT), Paris, done 15 July 1982, entered
into force 1 September 1985; Cmnd. 9069; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, C.II.1, and
the corresponding Operating Agreement Relating to the European Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (EUTELSAT), Paris, done 15 July 1982, entered into force 1 September 1985; Cmnd.
9154; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, C.II.2.
17Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), Geneva, done 24 May 1983, entered into force 19 June
1986; as amended 14 July 1994, entered into force 27 July 1994; Cmnd. 9483; Space Law – Basic
Legal Documents, C.III.1; 44 ZLW 68 (1995).
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allow for opting out with regard to any space programme in which a state is not par-
ticularly interested,18 the Netherlands has contributed (usually with a modest share)
to many of such programmes, including that of building the International Space
Station.19
In all such cases, however, Dutch contributions either take the form of direct
governmental involvement or, if private, of subcontracting at the level of hard-
ware or software development. Thus, in none of these cases was particular attention
necessary for implementation of the relevant clauses of the corpus juris spatialis
internationalis at the domestic level.
10.3 New Developments: The Changing Dutch “Spacescape”
Such was the situation regarding the Dutch “spacescape” roughly until well into
the 1990s. It may be noted that, until that point, amongst the Western-European
countries, only Norway20 (in a very perfunctory fashion), Sweden21 and the United
Kingdom22 had bothered to establish their respective national space laws. Then,
however, several developments started to converge to create a new environment for
space activities in the Dutch context.
One development of global dimensions concerned a general tendency to increas-
ingly accept private parties as proper partners in space endeavours also outside
the United States (which had already in 1984 enacted its first national space act
providing for the licensing of private space actors).23 This development was cer-
tainly stimulated by the breakdown of communism in the Soviet Union, and the
1991 collapse of the Soviet Union itself, causing the most significant international
opposition to capitalism and private enterprise in general (as well as the Cold War
18Cf. Artt. V(1.b), XIII(2), ESA Convention.
19Hence, the Netherlands is one of the eleven ESA member states parties to the Agreement among
the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency,
the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of
the United States of America concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station,
Washington, done 29 January 1998, entered into force 27 March 2001; Space Law – Basic Legal
Documents, D.II.4.
20Act on launching objects from Norwegian territory into outer space, No. 38, 13 June 1969;
National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 286.
21Act on Space Activities, 1982: 963, 18 November 1982; National Space Legislation of the
World, Vol. I (2001), at 398; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, E.II.1; 36 Zeitschrift für Luft-
und Weltraumrecht (1987), at 11; and Decree on Space Activities, 1982: 1069; National Space
Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 399; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, E.II.2; 36
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht (1987), at 11.
22Outer Space Act, 18 July 1986, Chapter 38 ; National Space Legislation of the World,
Vol. I (2001), at 293; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, E.I; 36 Zeitschrift für Luft- und
Weltraumrecht (1987), at 12.
23This concerned the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act, Public Law 98-365, 98th
Congress, H.R. 5155, 17 July 1984; 98 Stat. 451; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, E.III.4;
shortly followed by the Commercial Space Launch Act, Public Law 98–575, 98th Congress, H.R.
3942, 30 October 1984; 98 Stat. 3055; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, E.III.3.
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calling for governmental control over space activities) to disappear almost entirely.
Russia, as the Soviet Union’s main successor, established a national space law
providing for a licensing system for private space actors in 1993,24 whereas the
Ukraine, number two in the line of succession, followed suit in 1996.25
A second development concerned, for Europe, the increasing involvement of
the European Community, later European Union, in the area of space activities.
Whereas until 1985 the ESA served as the exclusive framework for the determina-
tion and implementation of any European space policies (as distinct from national
space policies of the member states), the European Community under the 1986
Single Act26 received its first – albeit marginal – measure of competence in the area
of space, to the extent that space activities could be subsumed under the heading of
“research and development”.
The increasing commercialisation of the telecommunications sector as a whole,
and the specific sub-sector of satellite communications following closely on its
heels, caused such involvement to shift into higher gear. The 1987 Green Paper on
the liberalisation of telecommunications27 had explicitly excluded satellite commu-
nications, but this omission was soon remedied by another Green Paper three years
later.28
The favourable reactions to the policy proposals of the Commission in the
1990 Green Paper for the purpose of liberalising and privatising satellite commu-
nications then led the Commission to establish the baseline for that process by
means of the 1994 Satellite Directive,29 to be followed in due course by more
Directives and Regulations guiding the process further along.30 As a result of
such measures, an Internal Market for telecommunications in general, but also for
24Law of the Russian Federation on Space Activities, No. 5663-1, 20 August 1993, effective 6
October 1993; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 101.
25Law of the Ukraine on Space Activities, No. 502/96-VR, 15 November 1996: National Space
Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 36.
26Single European Act, Luxembourg/The Hague, done 17/28 February 1986, entered into force 1
July 1987; 25 ILM 506 (1986); OJ L 169/1 (1987).
27Towards a Dynamic European Economy – Green Paper on the Development of the Common
Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, Communication from the Commission,
COM(87) 290 final, of 30 June 1987; OJ C 257/1(1987).
28Towards Europe-wide systems and services – Green Paper on a common approach in the field
of satellite communications in the European Community, Communication from the Commission,
COM (90) 490 final, of 20 November 1990.
29Commission Directive amending Directive 88/301/EEC and Directive 90/388/EEC in particular
with regard to satellite communications, 94/46/EC, of 13 October 1994; OJ L 268/15 (1994).
30Examples concerned the Commission Directive amending Directive 90/387/EEC with regard
to personal and mobile communications, 96/2/EC, of 16 January 1996; OJ L 20/59 (1996); the
Commission Directive amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full
competition in telecommunications markets, 96/19/EC, of 13 March 1996; OJ L 74/13 (1996);
and the Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a coordinated authorization
approach in the field of satellite personal communications systems in the Community, No.
710/97/EC, of 24 March 1997; OJ L 105/4 (1997).
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satellite communications in particular, was gradually arising within the European
Community, then Union.
Finally, these developments within the European context mirrored closely related
developments at the global level. In the mid-1990s the World Trade Organisation
(WTO),31 almost as soon as it was established, started to apply the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)32 to the telecommunications sector, by
means of the 1997 Agreement on Basic Telecommunication Services33 and the indi-
vidual schedules of commitments to open up national markets on a reciprocal basis.
Increasing pressure also upon the incumbent international satellite organizations
INTELSAT, INMARSAT and EUTELSAT could gather steam in these contexts,
leading to their ultimate but inevitable privatization by the turn of the century.
For the Netherlands, these developments brought the prospect of private space
activities for commercial gain to the fore and the possibility for the country to bene-
fit from such developments. The privatisation process left its mark, for example, on
the incumbent national telecommunications service provider PTT, later KPN, both
in relation to its own status and as to its hitherto exclusive access to the interna-
tional satellite communication infrastructure offered by INTELSAT, INMARSAT
and EUTELSAT for the Dutch market. However, this did not trigger much thought
on any need or desirability for a Dutch national space law, since there did not seem
to be any newcomers waiting in the aisles to enter the Dutch market yet.
Furthermore, the clustering of private space companies from major European
states looking for a neutral home for their overarching construction led to the legal
establishment of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space company (EADS) as
the holding consortium in the Netherlands, headquartered in Amsterdam, though it
should be noted that this concerned the manufacturing industry only.
Therefore, the two single most important developments in this area which finally
triggered discussion within the Netherlands towards the end of the 1990s on the
desirability or even the need for a national space law and accompanying licensing
system were the establishment of two new private companies of a rather different
nature.
10.4 Mircorp and New Skies Satellites
By the turn of the century, an exciting new prospect in terms of manned spaceflight
loomed. With the Russians strapped for cash and their Mir space station hanging on
against all odds following a few serious incidents, the possibility of extremely rich
31The WTO was created under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Marrakesh, done 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995; 1867 UNTS; UKTS 1996
No. 57; ATS 1995 No. 8; 33 ILM 1125, 1144 (1994).
32General Agreement on Trade in Services, Marrakesh, done 15 April 1994, entered into force 1
January 1995; ATS 1995 No. 8.
33Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services, Geneva, done 15 February 1997, entered
into force 5 February 1998; ATS 1998 No. 9; 36 ILM 354 (1997).
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private individuals paying for their own trip to, and stay on board an orbiting space
station followed by a safe homebound journey, was all of a sudden becoming very
real.
A small company was established in the Netherlands, called MirCorp, for the
purpose of brokering appropriate deals between the Russian Space Agency and
potential customers willing to pay sums of money in the range of US$ 20,000,000
for a one-week trip to the Russian space station. In the final resort, though Mir itself
had to be de-orbited prematurely (from this perspective) in early 2001, this initiative
resulted in the first-ever tourist in outer space, Dennis Tito, being sent to the ISS in
April 2001.
The final stretch of the deal no longer saw MirCorp in charge, as in the meantime
it had been somehow restructured and replaced by Space Adventures, with the busi-
ness operation thus essentially being relocated to the United States. Nevertheless,
the prospect of a private company which, because of its headquarters and formal
place of establishment, was to be considered a Dutch company for the purposes of
international law34 (including space law),35 suddenly brought the possibility of the
legal involvement of the Netherlands under international space law to the fore.
MirCorp’s clients would be launched “by” Russia, (i.e., the Russian Space
Agency) on board a Soyuz spacecraft from the Bajkonur launch base, which quali-
fied as a Russian launch facility on Kazakh territory. Hence any damage caused by
those Soyuz flights would, under the Liability Convention, lead to joint and several
liability of Russia and Kazakhstan.36 The fact that MirCorp, as a Dutch company for
the purposes of international (space) law, was actually the launch customer, how-
ever, raised the question whether this would in addition qualify the Netherlands
as the state “which (. . .) procure[d] the launch”37 – and thus the spectre for the
Netherlands to be faced with claims that it would be jointly and severally liable for
such damage, too.
There is no clear guidance on the international level as to what extent a “State
which (. . .) procures the launch” would, should or could, for the purpose of the
Liability Convention, be considered to include a state whose company procures the
launch, though it would be fair to say that most authors on the subject would, indeed,
uphold the broader interpretation.38 Therefore, with a view to the possibility of such
34Cf. e.g. the famous dictum of the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction
Case; Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Second
Phase)(Belgium v. Spain), International Court of Justice, 5 February 1970, I.C.J. Rep. 1970, 4,
at 42, § 70.
35Cf. Article III of the Outer Space Treaty.
36Cf. Articles I(c) and V of the Liability Convention.
37Article I(c), sub (i) of the Liability Convention.
38It should be kept in mind that the Liability Convention just refers to “a state which (. . .) pro-
cures” (Article I(c) (i); emphasis added), not to “a state which procures or whose private entities
procure”; references to private enterprise should not be simply read into a case where explicitly
only reference is made to “states”. With reference furthermore to the manner in which individ-
ual states have implemented this clause, as it turns out most states have actually refrained from
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a claim being actually brought forward at some point in time, it was clear that the
Netherlands would do well to consider domestic implementation, including a sys-
tem of licensing, liability reimbursement and insurance provisions, of the relevant
elements of the Liability Convention at the very minimum.
As indicated, MirCorp was relocated to the United States before any such imple-
mentation could take effect, but this is where the other new, private company of
interest came in: New Skies Satellites. New Skies Satellites originated in the bosom
of INTELSAT, which in the course of the mid-1990s faced the combined pressure
of calls for privatisation and its own inability to appropriately and flexibly handle
high-end value-added commercial satellite services. As one consequence of those
developments, it was announced on 31 March 1998 that New Skies Satellites would
be established as an independent private company, with its legal incorporation in
the Netherlands and its headquarters in The Hague. It was bequeathed with six of
INTELSAT’s twenty-four then-operational satellites as start-up capital assets.
By itself, the establishment of New Skies Satellites and the transfer of six
satellites in orbit to it would have called for a measure of “authorization and contin-
uing supervision” as the operation of the satellites and the leasing of transponders
on board by the company would certainly qualify as “national activities in outer
space” for which the Netherlands would bear international responsibility.39 Also,
the mere fact of legal incorporation and establishment of physical headquarters in
the Netherlands gave the Dutch authorities the actual opportunity to exercise the
necessary measure of control (“authorization and continuing supervision”) over the
company. At the time, however, existing business operation requirements under gen-
eral Dutch law were considered sufficient to take care of any potential risk that New
Skies Satellites’ activities would come into conflict with the provisions of the Outer
Space Treaty and other rules of space law without the Dutch authorities being aware
of such conflicts. Consequently, the Netherlands would be able to comply with and
take care of its voluntarily assumed international obligations.
Next to the general accountability which Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty
imposed on the Netherlands, however, there was no need to cover international
liabilities under the Liability Convention. The six satellites had been launched as
INTELSAT satellites, which under the Liability Convention’s premise of “once a
launching state, always a launching state” meant that the later transfer of ownership
of the satellites in orbit did not change anything regarding their status under that
Convention.40
requiring a license merely for the procurement by a private company of a launch, which means that
those states apparently consider private procurement not to be included, so that it is not necessary
to domestically cover themselves against presumed international consequences under the Liability
Convention. As a matter of fact, the UK Outer Space Act is the only domestic space law that
explicitly requires a license for the mere activity of procuring a launch (as per Section 1(a)). While
most authors, as indicated, hold an opposite view, an unequivocal interpretation of the Liability
Convention’s text by states is clearly absent.
39Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.
40It should be kept in mind that the Liability Convention does not take any other state into consider-
ation for apportionment of liability but the state(s) involved in the launch as “launching states”, and
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Since INTELSAT itself had not made use of the option under Article XXII
of the Liability Convention to accept the substantive rights and duties of the
Convention by a special Declaration,41 presumably the totality of member states of
INTELSAT should be seen as jointly fulfilling the criterion of states having procured
the launches of those six satellites. The Netherlands was thus only one amongst
many, and any potential claim would have been dealt with by applicable internal
INTELSAT procedures.
The effect of any contractual arrangements on this matter between New Skies
Satellites on the one hand and INTELSAT / the INTELSAT member states on the
other would there remain exclusively internal in effect, and not change the situation
vis-à-vis third states under the Liability Convention.
This fundamentally changed in 2002 however, a year after the launch of the first
space tourist as originally arranged by MirCorp. New Skies Satellites was experi-
encing continuous market growth and prospering as a consequence, and soon was in
need of additional satellite capacity. Thus, in April 2002, the company had its first
new satellite launched, and more would follow, and this time there was little doubt
that New Skies Satellites was directly involved in the manufacture and launch of
satellites itself.
There was some discussion at that time whether the “turn-key” contract which
New Skies Satellites had concluded with the satellite manufacturer, which tasked the
latter to arrange for and buy the launch and hand over the “keys” to the satellite only
once it was in orbit, would qualify the Dutch company as the “procuring entity”.
However, the better view is clearly that, even if New Skies Satellites was not directly
paying for the launch, its interest in having the satellite launched was the sole reason
why it was launched, so that this would, at the very least, constitute “procurement
by proxy”.
As discussed earlier, once the company would be considered to have procured the
launch, most authors would agree that this would effectively mean that (in this case)
the Netherlands would qualify as the procuring state for purposes of the Liability
Convention. Thus, this development finally set the train in motion leading to the
ultimate drafting of a Dutch national space law.
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, triggered by an “alert” from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that amongst others the above developments might
involve international responsibility and liability for the Dutch state under the
applicable treaties, took the lead. It firstly commissioned two studies, one by the
International Institute of Air and Space Law in Leiden on the narrower legal aspects
neither Liability Convention nor Registration Convention have allowed for qualification as launch-
ing / liable state after the launch, e.g. by in-orbit take-over. Even more crucially, the Registration
Convention does not even formally allow for re-registration.
41It may be noted, that Article XXII(1), Liability Convention, specifically required a majority of
INTELSAT member states (some 140 at the time) to be parties to the Outer Space Treaty and the
Liability Convention itself, which is a quite stringent condition – even as of 1 January 2006, the
Outer Space Treaty had 98 states parties, the Liability Convention 83. See the website of the UN
Office for Outer Space Affairs, at http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaties.html.
10 Regulation of Space Activities in The Netherlands 235
and one by a British consultancy firm Actinus on the broader economic and political
ramifications and parameters. Without much hesitation, both studies recommended
the drafting of a stand-alone framework national space law, rather than the amend-
ment of existing regulations pertaining to general licensing of businesses, as the
specifics of the international “spacescape” would not be easily taken account of in
sufficient measure under the latter approach.
Next, as part of a broader process within the Ministry of Economic Affairs
of reinvigorating Dutch involvement in all sorts of space activities and applica-
tions, especially as pushed by Minister Brinkhorst during the period in which he
was at the helm (which lasted from 2003 to 2006), the Ministry of Economic
Affairs supervised the process of actual drafting, in cooperation with other rele-
vant Dutch Ministries such as those of Foreign Affairs, Transport and Waterworks
(in view of their key role in telecom and navigation applications), Agriculture (in
view of agricultural applications of space), Education and Science, Defence, and
Justice.
As a result, on 24 January 2007 the Dutch Space Activities Act (Law Incorp-
orating Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Establishment of a Registry of
Space Objects)42 was officially enacted by the Dutch Parliament and published on
6 March 2007. By decision of 30 November 2007, the Act finally entered into
force together with the Decision on the Register for Space Objects (Besluit reg-
ister ruimtevoorwerpen) which elaborated the relevant part on establishment of a
national register.43
The accompanying explanatory memorandum44 explains the background of the
Act by making specific reference to the Actieplan Ruimtevaart [Netherlands Space
Action Plan].45 As elaborated in the Actieplan, Dutch space activities will continue
to be conducted predominantly in an international context, taking into consideration
the character of the space sector as a high-technology industry characterized by high
investment and long payback times. The Actieplan then outlines the key ambitions
of, and priorities for, the Dutch government as being science (specifically listing
astrophysics, planetary research, gravitational research, atmospheric and climate
research, and microgravity research), operational usage of space activities (with
a focus on earth observation, satellite navigation and satellite communications),
and infrastructure development (from launch vehicles to satellite platforms and the
International Space Station).
42See 80 Staatsblad (2007), at 1.
43See 492 Staatsblad (2007).
44The Dutch version thereof can be found in Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar
2005-2006, 30 609, nr. 3. As with the Space Activities Act itself, the English translation used for
the purposes of this article, which is on file with the author, was an unofficial one; it was made
official however later in the course of 2007.
45See Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2004–2005, 24 446, nr. 27.
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10.5 The Dutch Space Activities Act
The Dutch Space Activities Act, as becomes already clear from its full title, effec-
tively incorporates two main aspects. It deals in particular with private space
activities for which the Netherlands could be held internationally responsible and/or
liable under the corpus juris spatialis internationalis, and the more specific issue of
establishing a formal registration procedure and a national register of space objects
with a view to, inter alia, dealing with the same set of space activities.
The Act comprises 28 sections, spread out over seven chapters.
10.5.1 Chapter 1: General Provisions
Chapter 1 comprises the General Provisions. Section 1 lists the relevant definitions,
of which the most interesting ones from the perspective of international space law
concern “space activities” (defined as “the launch, the flight operation or the guid-
ance of space objects in outer space”)46 and “space object” (“any object launched
or destined to be launched into outer space”).47
While it may be considered unlikely that space activities involving the launch of a
space object will take place from the Dutch territory (at least as far as the territory of
the Netherlands itself is concerned), the same does not apply to the flight operation
or the guidance of space objects in outer space. Navigation, tracking and control
of space objects during the launch phase and in outer space require a control centre
using remote-control technology, which could certainly be established on, and hence
the relevant activities conducted from, Dutch territory.
Section 2 warrants comprehensive quotation, as it defines the scope of the Act in
terms of its licensing system. It provides as follows:
1. This Act applies to space activities that are performed in or from within the
Netherlands or else on or from a Dutch ship or Dutch aircraft.
2. By Order in Council this Act can also be declared wholly or partly applicable to:
(a) designated space activities that are performed by a Dutch natural or juridical
person on or from the territory of a State that is not party to the Outer Space
Treaty or on or from a ship or aircraft that falls under the jurisdiction of a
State that is not party to the Outer Space Treaty;
(b) the organization of outer-space activities by a natural or juridical person
from within the Netherlands.
46Section 1(b), Space Activities Act. It may be noted, that the term “space activities” as such is not
to be found in the space treaties, only closely related ones appear; Article I, Outer Space Treaty, for
example refers to “the exploration and use of outer space”, whilst Article VI, Outer Space Treaty
refers to “activities in outer space”.
47Section 1(c), Space Activities Act. This definition is of interest inter alia with a view to
Article I (d), Liability Convention, and Article I(b), Registration Convention, which only offer
a rudimentary definition of the term “space object”.
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Firstly, it should be pointed out that “the Netherlands” in this context refers only
to that part of the territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands which is situated
in Europe. Whilst for the purpose of international law including the space treaties,
the Netherlands as a state includes the overseas territories of Aruba and the Dutch
Antilles, and hence would be internationally responsible and liable also for space
activities conducted from those territories, the approach has been taken internally to
allow those two territories to make up their own minds.48 It may be noted here, that
the government of Aruba has stated that it intends to draft regulations designed to bar
space activities from the territory of Aruba, whereas the government of the Dutch
Antilles plans to draft legislation that will be closely modelled on the provisions of
the Dutch Space Activities Act.
Secondly, the mere organization of space activities “from within the
Netherlands” does not automatically fall within the scope of the Act.49 This is espe-
cially interesting in the light of the discussion on the “procurement” of launches
referred to above, where the Dutch authorities consider that the mere organization
of activities in the Netherlands does not lead to liability for the Netherlands under
the Liability Convention. The explanatory memorandum specifically refers to the
commercial organization of space tourist flights as one of the activities under this
heading which might in the not-too-distant future require application of the Space
Activities Act. It should be pointed out, that once space tourist flights themselves
are conducted from the territory of the Netherlands, this would obviously fall within
the scope of Section 2(1) of the Act, and hence the Act would automatically apply.
Thus, in terms of delimiting its scope, the Space Activities Act applies the terri-
torial criterion in a broad sense in that it also encompasses activities to which Dutch
jurisdiction applies on a quasi-territorial basis, such as Dutch ships and Dutch air-
craft.50 The criterion of nationality is only applied, under Section 2(2), in case the
48As a consequence of this particular structure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the instrument
of a “Kingdom Act” is available to ensure that certain laws apply to the comprehensive Kingdom
of the Netherlands, that is including the overseas territories. Whilst the space treaties have been
implemented by means of such Kingdom Acts, it was decided not to use this instrument in case
of the Space Activities Act. Furthermore, it should be noted that currently major constitutional
changes in the status of the Dutch Antilles are taking place.
49In other words: also the Netherlands in principle does not consider “procurement” by a private
party to require a license for Liability Convention-purposes; although a possible exception might
be made in the future for space tourism.
50The terms “Dutch ship” and “Dutch aircraft” are defined by Section 1(d) and (e) respectively, in
both cases with reference to Dutch law. Space activities conducted “from a Dutch space object”
are not considered feasible for the time being, hence do not require inclusion in this clause at this
point. In addition, it should be noted that formally space objects do not acquire a “nationality”,
but merely a “state of registration” by virtue of Article VIII, Outer Space Treaty, and Article II,
Registration Convention. This is different for ships and aircraft; see resp. Article 5(1), Convention
on the High Seas, Geneva, done 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 September 1962; 450 UNTS
82; TIAS 5200; 13 UST 2312; UKTS 1963 No. 5; Cmnd. 584; ATS 1963 No. 12; and Article
91(1), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, done 10 December 1982,
entered into force 16 November 1994; 1833 UNTS 3 & 1835 UNTS 261; UKTS 1999 No. 81;
Cmnd. 8941; ATS 1994 No. 31; 21 ILM 1261 (1982) for ships; and Article 17, Convention on
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territory of a state not party to the Outer Space Treaty is concerned, in order to fill
any gaps in international responsibility resulting from that latter scenario.
Clearly then, the Netherlands views the reference to “national activities in outer
space” in Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty to refer principally to “activities
conducted from Dutch territory”, and only under special circumstances, almost as a
generous gesture to help prevent any gaps in international responsibility from occur-
ring, to “activities conducted in the territory of another State by Dutch nationals,
whether juridical or natural.”
10.5.2 Chapter 2: Licences
Chapter 2, comprising Sections 3–10, outlines the licensing regime which is
established by the Space Activities Act.
Section 3 is the key section. Subsection 1 constitutes the baseline, as it decrees the
fundamental illegality of conducting any of the space activities to which Section 2
makes reference without a proper license. Section 3(2) reiterates the focus of the
Act on private space activities, as activities performed by or under the responsibility
of the Dutch government do not require a license.
Subsection (3) prescribes the main conditions to which a license may be subject,
as far as the Act itself is concerned. It provides as follows:
Regulations and restrictions can be attached to the license for the following purposes:
(a) the safety of persons and goods;
(b) protection of the environment in outer space;
(c) financial security;
(d) protection of public order;
(e) security of the State;
(f) fulfilment of the international obligations of the State.
Those are quite general requirements which are found in most other national
space laws and licensing systems in one form or another.
Other Sections, however, add more specific or elaborate requirements. Section
3(4), for example, adds another key condition for procuring a license; i.e., the
licensee shall insure himself against any liability “arising from the space activities
for which a license is required”. A reasonability-criterion is built into the Act, as per
the estimate of the authorities.51
International Civil Aviation, Chicago, done 7 December 1944, entered into force 4 April 1947;
15 UNTS 296; TIAS 1591; Cmd. 6614; UKTS 1953 No. 8; ATS 1957 No. 5; ICAO Doc. 7300
for aircraft. At the same time, in view of the resulting jurisdiction and the prohibition of double
registration, for all practical purposes the registration of space objects should be deemed to lead to
the same result as the granting of nationality thereto.
51See Section 3(7), Space Activities Act, allowing imposition of further rules “in order to
implement the provisions of Subsection 4”.
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Next, Section 6 contains a list of grounds upon which the issuance of a license
must or may be refused, which of course also translates into requirements to be ful-
filled for such a grant. A license will be refused if “(a) this is necessary in order
to comply with a treaty or a binding decision of an international institution; (b)
(. . .) the safety of persons and goods, environmental protection in outer space, the
maintenance of public order or national security might be jeopardized by issu-
ing the licence; (c) its issuance would contravene rules laid down by or pursuant
to this Act.”52
In addition, a license, may be refused for certain self-evident or procedural
reasons, namely if: “(a) a previously issued licence has been revoked owing to
infringement of rules laid down by or pursuant to this Act or of the regulations
attached to the licence; (b) the applicant has not discharged his obligations under a
previously issued licence; (c) the application or the applicant does not comply with
the rules laid down by or pursuant to this Act; (d) there is good reason to fear that
the applicant will not act in accordance with the rules laid down by or pursuant to
this Act; (e) this is necessary in order to protect the interests referred to in Section
3, Subsection 3.”53
So, the Act essentially is a framework law, leaving considerable flexibility for
the Dutch authorities to add further requirements as expertise grows, concurrently
with the possibility to draft tailor-made provisions and requirements for specific
types and categories of space activities. For example, the Act allows the Minister to
impose additional requirements, which may relate to “(a) the applicant’s knowledge
and experience; (b) authorization for the use of frequency space [spectrum]”.54
Chapter 2 also contains a number of provisions which are essentially procedural
in nature. For example, there is a 6 month time limit within which a license applica-
tion has to be decided upon.55 Section 7 provides, in extended fashion, for reasons
for which a license may be revoked,56 and the applicable procedures for revocation.
Licenses are not transferable, although provision is made for cases in which the
license has been issued to “a juridical person that is merged, divided or changes its
name”, which is of course common practice in general business environments.57
52Section 6(1), Space Activities Act.
53Section 6(2), Space Activities Act.
54Section 4(3), Space Activities Act.
55See Section 5, Space Activities Act.
56Thus, the license will be revoked amongst others if that is necessary “to comply with a treaty
or a binding decision of an international institution” (Section 7(1.b)), or if “the safety of persons
and goods, environmental protection in outer space, the maintenance of public order or national
security” (Section 7(1.c)) would be jeopardised. Similarly, the license may be revoked amongst
others if the relevant rules have been infringed, if “the space activities have not been commenced
within the stipulated time limit” (Section 7(2.b)), if “the purpose of the space activities for which
the licence was issued has changed substantially” (Section 7(2.c)), or if “this is justified by a change
in the technical or financial capabilities of the licence-holder” (Section 7(2.d)).
57Section 8 of the Space Activities Act.
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Section 9 leaves open the possibility for the authorities to charge a fee for admin-
istrative services offered, viz. activities undertaken in the context of the licensing
process, without any reference to an amount or even a method for calculating it.
One reason for the vagueness of this provision was the lack of experience hitherto
in the Netherlands with license applications in such a special sector as space, and the
resulting unpredictability of most details of such applications. In the accompanying
explanatory memorandum, a very rough estimate of relevant costs for the adminis-
trative body is made, referring to application costs being in the range of 500–1,000
Euros, non-recurring costs in the range of 3,000–6,000 Euros and ongoing costs in
the range of 2,000–4,000 Euros per year.
Finally, Section 10 was drafted to focus on what is currently termed “Disasters”
but should more properly have been labelled “Incidents”. It casts a duty upon the
licensee to take steps to the greatest extent possible, to prevent any jeopardy to safety
of persons and goods, the environment of outer space, the maintenance of public
order and national security or damage that might result from the licensed activities
at issue. 58 This is essentially the definition of the concept of “incident” as it is used
in this Section. The unlikelihood of manned space activities being conducted from
the Netherlands (as opposed to being organised from the Netherlands)59 is evident
from the fact that the usual distinction in comparable regimes such as the Australian
national space law60 between “accidents” (where people actually get hurt or even
killed) and “incidents” (where such injury has been merely threatened but in the end
has remained absent) has not been used in this context.
The section also imposes the obligation to provide the Dutch authorities with
information on “a. the causes of the incident and the circumstances under which
the incident occurred; b. the relevant information that is needed in order to assess
the nature and the seriousness of the consequences of the incident; c. the steps
that have been taken or are being contemplated in order to prevent, limit or rec-
tify the consequences of the incident; and d. the steps that have been taken or are
being contemplated in order to prevent such an incident recurring during a space
activity”.61
10.5.3 Chapter 3: Registry of Space Objects
As mentioned above, the second major reason for establishing the Dutch Space
Activities Act relates to the establishment of a national register for space objects in
58 See Section 10(1) of the Space Activities Act.
59See the discussion supra, on the de facto exclusion in particular of space tourist activities from
the scope of the Act.
60Cf. Sections 85, 86, ff., An act about space activities, and for related purposes, No. 123 of 1998,
assented to 21 December 1998; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 197, as
amended by Act No. 100 of 2002.
61Section 10(2) of the Space Activities Act.
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fulfilment of relevant obligations under the Outer Space Treaty and the Registration
Convention.
To be sure, the relevance of such a national register was not limited to the private
activities which constitute the main target of the Act, as any space object launched
with the involvement of the Netherlands with the status of a “launching State” imme-
diately raises the issue as to whether the Netherlands should also act as the state of
registry (and in the hypothetical case where the Netherlands would qualify as the
only launching state, simply results in an obligation to do so).62
And, indeed, during the discussions on the development of the Space Activities
Act, it was repeatedly asserted that, in case a decision is made not to draft such an
Act, the need for the establishment of a national registry would remain indepen-
dently of such an Act. If the Act would not come about, other less administratively
burdensome but also less transparent and legally secure, means should be found to
achieve the desired result.
As it is, now Section 11 provides for the registration obligation as follows:
1. Our Minister shall maintain a registry with information concerning space objects
that are being used in connection with space activities as referred to in Section 2.
2. The licence-holder shall, at times to be determined by Order-in-Council, furnish
the information required for the registry.
3. Our Minister will be responsible for registering space objects that are being used
in connection with space activities that are performed under the responsibility of
one or more of Our Ministers.
4. Rules will be laid down by or pursuant to an Order-in-Council with a view to
implementing this section.63
As the explanatory memorandum makes clear, the information to be included in
the national register must, at any rate, include the information that the Netherlands
in turn would be obliged to provide to the UN Secretary-General for the purposes
of fulfilling obligations assumed under the Registration Convention.64 Article IV of
the Registration Convention in this regard provides for the following parameters:
(a) Name of launching State or States;
(b) An appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number;
(c) Date and territory or location of launch;
(d) Basic orbital parameters, including:
(i) Nodal period;
(ii) Inclination;
(iii) Apogee;
(iv) Perigee;
(e) General function of the space object.
62Cf. esp. Article II of the Registration Convention.
63
“Our Minister” is the standard legal phrase referring effectively to the government; the “our”
referring in the form of a pluralis majestatis to the Queen of the Netherlands.
64See Articles III and IV of the Registration Convention.
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The specific character of this chapter becomes clear once more where Section
11(3) of the Space Activities Act provides that governmental space activities fall
within the scope of the Act for this particular purpose.
10.5.4 Chapter 4: Redress
Chapter 4 harks back on the most significant scenario within the context of the risk
that licensed space activities cause damage of a possible catastrophic nature and size
as has been touched upon already;65 namely situations in which the liability regime
under the corpus juris spatialis internationalis becomes applicable.
The sole section in this chapter, Section 12, starts by establishing the primary
obligation of reimbursement – if the Netherlands “is obliged to pay compensation
under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty or the Liability Convention, the State
is entitled to recover this sum, in full or in part, from the party whose space activity
has caused the damage”.66 It may be recalled, that the liability regime under the
Liability Convention essentially provides for unlimited compensation.67
The principle of unlimited compensation however is qualified, or more precisely
the burden resulting from that principle for the licensee is mitigated by the clauses
limiting the liability of the licensee as well as the actual reimbursement of the
Dutch government “to the value of the sum insured”,68 referring back to Section
3(4) under which the Dutch government is given the discretion to determine “the
maximum possible cover”. From the explanatory memorandum it transpires that the
Dutch government is effectively contemplating the use of a loosely-defined version
of the Maximum Probable Loss-concept as used in comparable clauses in US and
Australian national licensing regimes.69
65See Section 3(3) with the most fundamental requirements for the granting of a license, and
Section 3(4) referring more specifically to the liability and insurance issues at stake.
66Section 12(1) of the Space Activities Act.
67Cf. Article XII of the Liability Convention, which specifies that “The compensation which the
launching State shall be liable to pay for damage under this Convention shall be determined in
accordance with international law and the principles of justice and equity, in order to provide
such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the person, natural or juridical, State or
international organization on whose behalf the claim is presented to the condition which would
have existed if the damage had not occurred.”
68Section 12(2), (3) of the Space Activities Act.
69Cf. for the United States, Section 16(a)(1)(A), Commercial Space Launch Act, Public Law
98-575, 98th Congress, H.R. 3942, 30 October 1984; 98 Stat. 3055; Space Law – Basic Legal
Documents, E.III.3, as amended by Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments, Public Law 100-
657, 100th Congress, H.R. 4399, 15 November 1988; 49 U.S.C. App. 2615; 102 Stat. 3900; Space
Law – Basic Legal Documents, E.III.3, 13 ff. and now codified as Section 70112(a.3), Commercial
Space Transportation – Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101 (1994); and for
Australia, Section 48(3), An act about space activities, and for related purposes, No. 123 of 1998,
assented to 21 December 1998; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 197, as
amended by Act No. 100 of 2002.
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In the alternative (depending, of course, on the manner in which the insurance
contract is drafted), the Netherlands can exercise its right of redress directly against
the insurer.70 In any event, the Dutch government is certain that any claim for com-
pensation made against it under applicable liability regimes of international space
law as a result of a licensee’s activities can, at least as to its substantive financial
consequences, be subrogated to the extent of the sum insured.
10.5.5 Chapter 5: Enforcement
Chapter 5 encompasses eleven sections, from Sections 13 to 23, dealing with var-
ious elements of enforcing the Space Activities Act and its licensing regime at the
domestic level. It includes some procedural aspects of determining whether infringe-
ments have occurred and of imposing the relevant sanctions. For example, the power
to impose penalties will lapse five years after the infringing act has been committed;
whereas objections and appeals are allowed for in due form.71 By their very nature,
many of these provisions refer back to existing elements of Dutch national law.
In view of the international nature of the space industry, an interesting clause
is contained in Section 20(2). For any oral discussion on potential infringements
of the Act and/or sanctions imposed as a consequence, a person “who does not
adequately understand the Dutch language” is entitled to an interpreter, “unless it
can reasonably be assumed that this is not necessary”.
Perhaps the most interesting section within this chapter is Section 15 that deals
with sanctions. Generally, violations of any of the licensing obligations contained
in Sections 3, 7 and 10 can be sanctioned with administrative penalties up to a
maximum of 450,000 Euros or 10% of the “relevant annual sales of the company in
the Netherlands, whichever is the greater”.72 Violations of the regulations pertaining
to the registration of relevant space objects can be sanctioned with administrative
penalties up to 100,000 Euros.73
10.5.6 Chapter 6: Amendments to Other Legislation
The sole Section comprising Chapter 6, which is Section 24, represents an effort to
ensure coherence and compatibility with existing Dutch national legislation while
maintaining the key benefit of the Space Activities Act, i.e., providing potential
space entrepreneurs with a one-stop licensing regime.
In particular, the offence resulting from Section 3 as regards the illegality of
undertaking space activities without a license respecting the conditions mentioned in
Subsection 3, the safety of persons and goods, protection of the environment in outer
70Section 12(4) of the Space Activities Act.
71Section 17(1) resp. (2) of the Space Activities Act.
72Section 15(1) of the Space Activities Act.
73Section 15(2) of the Space Activities Act.
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space, financial security, protection of public order, security of the Netherlands, and
fulfilment of the international obligations of the Netherlands, as well as a failure
to comply with necessary instructions as regards the activities under the license
under Section 7(3) or a failure to comply with the obligations of the licensee once
an incident has occurred under Section 10, are now all included in the scope of
the Economic Offences Act.74 Likewise, violations of the licensee’s obligations
with regard to the registration of licensed space objects are now incorporated in
the Economic Offences Act (notably as part of Section 1(4)) through Section 24(2)
of the Space Activities Act).
10.5.7 Chapter 7: Concluding Provisions
Chapter 7 comprising Sections 25–28, offers a surprisingly small number of con-
cluding provisions, including one clause referring to another Dutch Act (the General
Administrative Law Act) with a view to an impending amendment of that Act which
would cause some procedural clauses of the Space Activities Act to cease to apply.75
Section 25 is the most interesting provision in this chapter. It provides for a tran-
sitional arrangement, which, in view of the fact that at that point in time only New
Skies Satellites was a matter for consideration, is a very succinct one. Activities
already ongoing at the point in time when the new Act enters into force may con-
tinue for another twelve months without a license – but then would require a license
to be allowed to proceed.76
10.6 The Netherlands: A New Gateway to Outer Space?
It may seem that the process of domestic implementation of some key provisions of
the corpus juris spatialis internationalis in the Netherlands has only just begun. The
2007 Space Activities Act is a framework law for all practical purposes, even if it
manages to provide for a sufficient measure of implementation for the time being. As
the last formalities required before the Act can enter into force were being cleared
away, a process of further implementation by means of drafting a set of guidelines
was set in motion. At this stage, it would be premature to go much further in view
of the relatively scarce experience with private space entrepreneurship so far within
the Netherlands and the resulting uncertainty as to what the next application for a
license would look like in detail, let alone what common requirements could find
their way into a high-level comprehensive legislation.
74See Section 24(1) of the Space Activities Act. Reference is made here to Section 1(1) of the
Economic Offences Act.
75See Section 26 of the Space Activities Act.
76Section 25(1) of the Space Activities Act.
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At the same time, beyond New Skies Satellites which appears to be the most,
perhaps even the only visible player in this game at this stage, various new devel-
opments can be discerned by those looking at close range. Allusions have been
expressed about a second player in that very same game waiting in the wings for
a proper transparent legal regime to arise. Charting different territories, a small
company Isis has been established to broker piggy-back deals for small satellites
amongst other efforts to open up new and niche markets. And with the commercial
interest in space tourism spreading like wildfire, at least one venture is now seeking
out the Netherlands, notably its Caribbean dependencies, as a legal basis for their
operations.
Of course, many of such activities or initiatives would not automatically be Dutch
in nature. Yet, it is interesting to note that the Netherlands, with its national space
law well in place and on the verge of being activated, has now joined a still relatively
small group of Western states. As a matter of fact, since the mid-1980s when the
United Kingdom joined Norway and Sweden, just one more Western European state
had drafted national space law before the Netherlands caught on – the southern
neighbour of the Dutch: Belgium, in 2005.
Such major spacefaring nations within Europe as France, Germany, Italy and
Spain, though all to some extent involved in discussions regarding the establishment
of a proper national act dealing with, in particular, private space activities, interest-
ingly enough have not yet achieved that feat. Even France, indeed Western Europe’s
foremost space power and enjoying the presence since many years of Arianespace
and SpotImage, key players in the global private space arena, has only realised a
national space act after the Dutch did.77
From that perspective, it will certainly be interesting to follow the development
of the national legal framework for private space activities within the Netherlands. It
has turned out possible elsewhere too, for a mid-sized economy like the Netherlands
to become very prominent in proportional terms by the sheer means of offering legal
transparency in addition to international orientation, business acumen and a focus
on high-key technologies, and transport- and telecommunication-related applica-
tions. Maybe the low lands of the Netherlands will indeed provide an interesting
springboard into the high ground of outer space – provided of course, honouring
the tradition of Hugo Grotius, that space will largely be preserved for peaceful and
commercial purposes.
77This concerns the Law on Space Activities (Loi relative aux opérations spatiales); Loi No. 2008-
518 du 3 juin 2008; 34 Journal of Space Law (2008), at 453; unofficial translation 34 Journal of
Space Law (2008), at 453.
